January 24, 2003, E.C.B. 42/97/231
Between: |
Sam
Sangha and Can-Am Building Supply Ltd.
Claimant |
And: |
City
of Surrey
Respondent |
Before: |
Robert
W. Shorthouse, Chair |
Appearances: |
John
A. Coates, Q.C., Counsel for the Claimants
Anthony Capuccinello, Counsel for
the Respondent |
REASONS FOR DECISION
1. APPLICATION
[1] This
is an application under section 48 of the Expropriation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996,
c. 125 (the "Act") and the Tariff of Costs Regulation, B.C. Reg.
189/99 (the "Tariff"), for a review of the claimants' bill of legal
costs, dated September 9, 2002, and for an order for advance payment of costs.
[2] The
parties have reached agreement on the amount to be paid to the claimants under
every item in the bill of legal costs with the exception of Item 5, for which
the description reads: "Every process for commencing and prosecuting a claim
before the board", and Item 15, for which the description reads: "Attendance
before the board to assess costs". I have not been asked to formalize an
award of costs for those items upon which the parties agree.
[3] The
parties have elected to proceed before the board in respect of those cost items
in dispute by way of written submissions only. The claimants filed their application
for review on November 1, 2002, the respondent filed its submissions in response
on November 28, 2002, and the claimants filed a letter reply to the respondent's
submissions on December 4, 2002. There has been no oral cost hearing in this matter.
2. BACKGROUND
[4] A
review of documentation in the board's file indicates that the compensation proceeding
in this matter arises from a partial acquisition of lands situated at 11016 Bridge
Road, Surrey, British Columbia. The claimant, Sam Sangha ("Sangha"),
is the registered owner of the lands and the claimant, Can-Am Building Supply
Ltd. ("Can-Am"), operates a building supply business from the lands.
The respondent City of Surrey acquired a portion of the lands fronting on Bridge
Road in connection with a road widening project. The partial acquisition appears
to have been completed in or about December, 1996, evidently through an agreement
pursuant to section 3 of the Act.
[5] Compensation
proceedings were commenced on October 1, 1997, when the claimants filed with the
board an application for determination of compensation (the "Form A").
In their statement of claim within the Form A the claimants sought compensation
totalling $200,000 for the market value of the lands and for disturbance damages.
They served the Form A on the respondent on October 2, 1997.
[6] The
respondent filed its reply to the application for determination of compensation
(the "Form B") on November 18, 1997. In its Form B the respondent said
that the claimants had provided insufficient particulars to enable the respondent
to properly plead its case and that it required further and better particulars
with respect to several enumerated matters, including: (a) the basis on which
each claim is calculated and the facts in support of each element of compensation
claimed; (b) the respective amounts claimed by Sangha and Can-Am; (c) the quantum
claimed; and (d) the respective interests of Sangha and Can-Am in the lands.
[7] Shortly
following a change of solicitor, the claimants filed with the board on September
13, 2002 a ten paragraph document entitled "claimants' surrejoinder".
The surrejoinder amended and particularized the claim in several respects. Among
other things it stated that Sangha's claim for market value had been fully paid
and satisfied, and that the claim which remained to be pursued was that of the
corporate claimant Can-Am for disturbance damages. It alleged that Can-Am had
carried on business from the lands since 1972 and was in legal possession or occupation
of the whole of the lands when part of the lands were transferred to the respondent
under the section 3 agreement. It further alleged that Can-Am had suffered "grievous
business loss" during the construction or reconstruction of Bridge Road by
the respondent and quantified the lost sales said to have resulted from the "confusion
upheaval and disruption of traffic caused by the works on Bridge Road" in
the amount of $104,000.
3. THE
COST CLAIM UNDER ITEM 5
[8] It is the legal
costs of the claimants' surrejoinder, claimed under Item 5, upon which the parties
in the first instance disagree.
[9] Item 5 of
"Schedule 1 Legal Costs" under the Tariff provides for a minimum
of 1 unit and a maximum of 10 units for "every process for commencing and
prosecuting a claim before the board". Under section 4(6) of the Tariff,
if an item provides for minimum and maximum numbers of units, the reviewer has
the discretion to allow a number within that range of units, having regard to
how much time should ordinarily have been spent on the matter.
[10] In
the bill of legal costs the claimants have claimed 5 units under Item 5 for the
preparation and filing of the surrejoinder. They say that it was in order to meet
the respondent's demand for particulars that they filed the additional document,
which was in the nature of further pleadings. They submit that a claim for 5 units
under Item 5 is both fair and reasonable.
[11] The
respondent submits that, since the surrejoinder does not commence a new claim,
but instead was filed as part of the existing proceedings in order to address
deficiencies in the original Form A, additional units are not recoverable pursuant
to Item 5 of the Tariff. To conclude otherwise, the respondent says, suggests
that every amendment to a Form A would entitle a claimant to a maximum of 10 additional
units. The respondent also questions the appropriateness of the use of the term
"surrejoinder".
[12] It seems to me
that both parties are under some misapprehension as to the recovery of legal costs
under Item 5.
[13] Item 5 is one of 23 items
of description within Schedule 1 in respect of which legal costs incurred that
are "proper or reasonably necessary to conduct the proceeding" within
the meaning of section 3(2) of the Tariff may be claimed. Many of these items
provide for a fixed number of units and in some cases the fixed number may be
claimed more than once, for example, for attendance at successive interlocutory
applications under Item 13 and at successive applications to assess advance costs
under Item 15 or for each day of attendance at the hearing of a compensation claim
under Item 19. Other items of description which provide for a minimum and maximum
range impose an upper limit on the number of units that can be claimed for all
legal work falling within that description over the course of the proceedings.
[14] Item 5, which logically pertains to the
preparation and filing of a Form A and any subsequent amendment to or particularization
of the Form A, clearly falls within the latter category just described. The words
"every process" are to be read as both cumulative and all-encompassing.
The maximum number of units which could be awarded to a claimant under Item 5
by the conclusion of the proceedings is 10 units.
[15] The
cumulative nature of legal work falling under Item 5 is demonstrated in the second
of the board's section 48 cost decisions in Danny James Topping and Tina Marie
Topping v. H.M.T.Q. in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented
by the Minister of Transportation and Highways, unreported, E.C.B. No. 40/99,
January 16, 2001. At para. 6 the vice chair stated:
[6]
Item 5 is for commencing and prosecuting a claim. One unit was awarded in the
last review. Nine units are claimed in this account and Mr. Melville indicates
that one further hour out of a total of five hours of legal services have been
expended on this item. This appears to be for an amended Form A at the compensation
hearing with new numbers for amounts claimed in line with the evidence. As I said
in the first review [reported at 73 L.C.R. 72], very little time should ordinarily
have been spent commencing and prosecuting this claim that was solely for moving
costs. Two units altogether is appropriate and therefore I award one further unit.
[16] Accordingly,
there is no substance to the respondent's expressed concern that awarding units
for the preparation and filing of the claimants' surrejoinder leads to the prospect
of a claimant being entitled to as much as an additional 10 units for every amendment
to a Form A.
[17] I also see no merit in entering
into a terminological discussion as to whether use of the term "surrejoinder"
was an appropriate description of the document which the claimants filed. I am
satisfied that it was intended as the claimants' answer to the respondent's demand,
as expressed in the Form B, for further and better particulars and that it further
served to narrow the scope of the claim. The claimants, in preparing and filing
that document, were clearly "prosecuting" their claim within the meaning
of Item 5.
[18] There are, however, some difficulties
arising from the way in which the claimants have presented their claim under Item
5. They have not attempted an estimation of the legal work performed under this
item of description pre- and post-Tariff nor have they given a clear indication
as to the stage which the proceedings have reached. They have also not provided
any back up evidence as to the time spent. These are all matters which the reviewer
must necessarily consider in fixing the appropriate number of units within the
bill of costs.
[19] The Tariff applies to legal
costs claimed that were incurred on or after June 28, 1999. Prior to that date,
the legal costs payable are governed by the "actual reasonable" standard
under section 45(7)(a) of the Act. In the present instance the claimants commenced
their claim before the board on October 1, 1997, and the legal costs associated
with the preparation and filing of the Form A therefore fall outside the Tariff.
[20] The
board has previously determined that, in fixing the appropriate number of units
under an item of description in the Tariff for legal work performed, account should
be taken of legal work of the same description performed in the pre-Tariff period
so as to avoid double compensation: see Chu v. School District No. 36 (Surrey)
(2001), 72 L.C.R. 89, at pp. 109-110.
[21] There
was no indication in the submissions before me on this application as to whether
any pre-Tariff legal costs had been billed or paid. It is evident that the claimants'
claim for 5 units under Item 5 relates only to the preparation and filing of the
surrejoinder and does not take into account the earlier pleadings.
[22] The
claimants evidently consider that the amount of time which should ordinarily have
been spent to create what they describe as a "lengthy" ten paragraph
document will be apparent on its face and will lead to the conclusion that the
5 units claimed are "both fair and reasonable". Having the document
itself to review is certainly of some assistance, but other supporting evidence
would also have been preferable. The document essentially consists of two pages.
It cannot properly be characterized as lengthy. The paragraphs contain uncomplicated
allegations of fact with reference in some cases to applicable sections of the
Act and, in one instance, to the section 3 agreement. In my view their preparation
would not ordinarily have required even an average amount of time. I am therefore
not satisfied that preparation and filing of the surrejoinder justifies an award
of 5 units which is one-half the maximum allowable for all legal work falling
within Item 5.
[23] I take note of the fact
that the claimants have filed no further documents in the nature of pleadings
or particulars since filing the surrejoinder and that the compensation hearing
in this matter was scheduled to be heard commencing on January 13, 2003, but was
necessarily adjourned by consent for reasons of ill health on January 10, 2003.
At that point it appears that no further legal work falling under Item 5 was likely.
[24] Having
regard to all of the foregoing considerations, I conclude that 3 units should
be awarded under Item 5 for the preparation and filing of the surrejoinder. The
parties are agreed that all items in the bill of legal costs are to be assessed
at Scale 2 under the Tariff, which is "for matters of ordinary difficulty
or importance". The value allowed on an assessment of legal costs under Scale
2 is $140 for each unit.
4. THE
COST CLAIM UNDER ITEM 15
[25] The claimants
have requested that I also set the number of units to be allowed under Item 15.
Item 15 of Schedule 1 is for attendance before the board to settle an order or,
as in this instance, to assess costs. It provides for a fixed number of 4 units
for each day of attendance. The claimants have claimed 4 units under Item 15 in
their bill of legal costs with respect to this application.
[26] The
respondent has requested that I defer any award of costs of this application "until
the outcome of the proceedings", which I construe to mean the entire compensation
proceedings. Alternatively, the respondent has submitted that I should find that
costs are not recoverable by the claimants on the basis that this application
was "unnecessary and amounts to a waste of the Board's time."
[27] I
see no reason to defer making an award of the costs of this application and, given
the position taken by the respondent with respect to Item 5, I am unable to conclude
that the application was unnecessary. The parties' mutual decision to proceed
by way of written submissions only on this minor matter was a responsible one.
[28] For
the purpose of making an award of costs under Item 15, I find that the presentation
by way of written submissions should be treated as an "attendance before
the board" to assess costs. What is somewhat surprising is that the claimants
in their bill of legal costs have not also made a claim under Item 14, which is
for "preparation for attendance referred to in Item 15, for each day of attendance".
Item 14 provides a fixed number of 2 units per day. The claimants may have felt
that, having prepared written submissions for the board but not having actually
physically attended at a cost hearing, they were not entitled to claim for both.
In my view, they are so entitled and I would therefore include in the award an
appropriate number of units under Item 14.
[29] In
my view, having regard to the scope of the submissions on this application, an
oral hearing would not have consumed anything approaching 2 1/2 hours. That being
the case, section 4(7) of the Tariff comes into play. The relevant portions provide:
|
4 |
(7) |
If an item in the tariff provides for |
|
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| (a) |
an amount for each day but the time spent
during the day is less than 2 1/2 hours, only 1/2 of the amount is allowed for
that day, |
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(c) |
an
amount for preparation for an attendance but the time spent on the attendance
is less than 2 1/2 hours, only 1/2 of the amount for preparation is allowed. |
[30] Accordingly, I conclude that 2 units
should be awarded under Item 15 for attendance before the board to assess costs
and a further 1 unit should be awarded under Item 14 for preparation for attendance.
As previously indicated, the parties have agreed on an assessment of all items
in the bill of legal costs at Scale 2, or $140 for each unit.
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